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Queers and Muslims: The Dutch Case 
 
Gert Hekma 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
For about a decade, antagonisms have been mounting between Muslim and gay men. In 
particular, when El Moumni spoke out against homosexuality in 2001, many politicians 
and gays reacted angrily. White Dutch got the feeling that Muslims did not respect or 
accept gays, lesbians, and women in general because of their supposedly homophobic and 
sexist views.1 That a disproportional part of the anti-gay violence can be attributed to 
male Moroccan youngsters has become another ground upon which to attack Muslims. 
Pim Fortuyn, the right- wing leader who was murdered in 2002, exploited the anti-
homosexuality stance of a large portion of the Muslim religious leaders and the queer 
bashing attributed to ethnic minority youth, using it as a stick to beat the Muslims for 
their backwardness. They should not be able to sufficiently integrate in a Dutch society 
that is defined, in the eyes of the right wing, by its longstanding support for the 
emancipation of women, gays, and lesbians. Although the issue of gay-Muslim relations 
is continuously discussed in Dutch society and politics, the political answers have been 
unconvincing up until now. Rhetoric has been more important than doing something. In 
this article, I will first discuss the early history of the gay-Muslim debate, then the 
subsequent rise of antagonism since the interventions by El Moumni and Fortuyn, and 
finally the contemporary social and political answers on the issue. 
   The focus regarding Muslims will be on Moroccans. Although the number of people of 
Turkish descent is higher than that of Moroccan descent (380,000 versus 340,000) and 
there are substantial numbers of Muslims of other ethnicities (a third of the 340,000 
Surinamese, for example),2 male youth of Moroccan origin are most often seen as the 
troublemakers. Of course, not all Moroccans or Turks are Muslim, and there also are 
differences in religious beliefs between and inside ethnicities. The Turkish Alevites, for 
example, have less strict views on gender and sexual relations than other groups that 
sometimes reject them for their religious liberalism. Most of the Moroccans came from 
the northern Rif area and are Berbers, not urban Arabs. Likewise, most Turks arrived 
from conservative Anatolia, not from modern cities. Notwithstanding their traditional 
background, the first generation of immigrants was rather lax in its practice of religion. It 
was the second generation that could be said to be more modern, for example, because of 
higher levels of education, but they also became more strict and orthodox in terms of 
religion. As elsewhere, the number of women wearing scarves has grown significantly 
since the early 1990s. 
 
II.  Background 
 
For a long time, Morocco was mainly known by gay men as an exciting tourist 
destination. In particular, Tangier, when it was an international enclave (1923–1956), 
attracted many homosexual tourists, such as Paul and Jane Bowles, Tennessee Williams, 
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William Burroughs, Joe Orton, Jean Genet, Juan Goytisolo, and many others less well 
known.3 The sexual outcasts from the West found exile in this border city of the Orient. 
What had been Capri and Taormina in Italy, the French Riviera, or Tunisia and Algeria 
before the Second World War, became Morocco in the 1950s and 1960s. Single men who 
visited the main tourist attractions were accosted by young men, who not only sold goods 
but also their bodies. What has become known as sex tourism was part and parcel of 
Morocco’s attractions for many gay men. Nowadays, Marrakech and to a lesser degree 
Tangier, Agadir, and Essaouira continue this gay tradition. The Dutch poet and writer Jan 
Hanlo (1912–1969) left a moving tribute of his visit to Marrakech in which he described 
his tumultuous relationship with an 11-year-old black boy, Mohamed, in Go to the Mosk, 
a Dutch novel with an English title, published in 1971. As a Catholic, he did not want to 
have the sex that Mohamed and his friends eagerly offered, but one time he could not 
resist.  
   Moroccans came to the Netherlands halfway through the 1960s as “guest workers.” 
They were mostly single men, often coming from France and Belgium where they had 
worked. Seduced by the better pay and work conditions, they continued north. Other men 
were directly recruited from Morocco by Dutch companies.4 There is little known about 
how these single men organized their sexual lives, but they certainly had white 
girlfriends, went to prostitutes, and also had gay sex, both among themselves and with the 
locals. It remains unclear how actively they participated in male sex work as compared 
with their compatriots back home. Their rather free social and erotic life ended in the late 
1970s, when the guest workers brought their recently founded families or their new 
brides over to the Netherlands.  
   A second generation of Dutch Moroccans made its appearance in urban life, the result 
of fertile families that had arrived since the late 1970s. In the 1980s, a new situation 
developed, with a growing Moroccan population that started to transform churches and 
old industrial buildings into mosques or to build new ones. The demographic and urban 
landscape changed. The single men had become family fathers. Instead of living a male 
homo-social life in hostels, they now created hetero-social nuclear families and started to 
pay attention to religion. Most of them began to look more like their fathers in Morocco 
than their Dutch colleagues or neighbors. 
 
III.  2001 
 
It took some time before the new situation received critical attention in the political arena 
and media. The ideal of a multicultural society where many different ethnicities 
peacefully lived together faltered. Neighbors complained about the loud noises and 
strange smells the new immigrants produced. Dutch women who dressed sexily were 
sometimes insulted as being whores. In criminal statistics and the media, Surinamese 
were replaced by Turks and even more by Moroccans as being the most prone to commit 
crimes. While the white population of poor urban areas began to complain about their 
new neighbors, politicians showed concern but no alarm as most of them continued to 
believe in multicultural ideals. 
   Slowly, the white Dutch got “realistic,” meaning that they abandoned the ideals of a 
multicultural society and became convinced that the new immigrants caused many 
problems that had not existed before on this scale. The extreme Right had always said so, 
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but they had been politically marginalized. The first respectable politician who voiced 
this idea in the 1990s was Frits Bolkestein, leader of the conservative-liberal party 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, or 
VVD). This party represents the capitalist entrepreneurs who brought the guest workers 
to Holland out of economic interests, but did not take responsibility for the cultural 
consequences once the guests became locals. The most vocal opponent of immigration 
was openly gay Pim Fortuyn, whose spectacular rise to celebrity status in 2001 changed 
the Dutch political landscape radically. His party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), received a 
sixth of the votes in the national elections of May 2002. It put an end to eight years of 
“purple” government (i.e., non-Christian, with a liberal approach). This cabinet had 
opened up marriage for same-sex couples and legalized prostitution. It consisted of 
conservative and progressive liberals (VVD and D66) and the Labour Party (PvdA). 
   Some days before the elections of 2002, Fortuyn was murdered by an animal rights 
activist who opposed his support for the meat and fur industry, rather than his critique of 
Muslims. Fortuyn had begun as a Marxist professor in the social sciences in Groningen 
during the 1970s, and had become a typical right-wing politician by the end of the 
century. He was a populist and against bureaucracy and a strong state. In favor of more 
police and tougher sentences for criminals, he also wanted to stop immigration. He was 
popular among many Dutch who praised him because “he dared to say the truth” that 
other politicians were apparently hiding. One of the “truths” they liked was his critique of 
multicultural society. His followers did not always like homosexuals, but they admired 
Fortuyn (like they do the gay comedians on television of which Holland has its share: 
André van Duin, Paul de Leeuw, Paul Haenen, Jos Brink). In other words, homosexuals 
are nice at a distance rather than close-by. Fortuyn may have been a faithful Catholic, but 
he loved dark rooms for sex better than churches for praying, as he told an Orthodox 
Protestant journalist some days before his murder. He knew very well, he said, that 
Moroccan culture was backward because he had slept with Moroccan youngsters. In the 
media, he was typically presented as a gay dandy with expensive suits and cars, and a 
grand house full of male nude art. He was the complete opposite of the poor young 
ruffians with whom he had sex.5 After Fortuyn was murdered, his party had no gay 
political agenda and no gay politicians any longer. The next governments were led by 
Christian-Democrat Jan Peter Balkenende (2002–2010). The first of these was with 
Fortuyn’s party, LPF, which was unsuccessful because of internal fighting among the 
inexperienced ministers of the LPF. Balkenende’s cabinets (the next ones were with 
VVD, D66, and PvdA) gradually became stricter on immigration and integration of non-
Western persons. It also promoted conservative sexual policies with a focus on traditional 
values and the nuclear family. Gays and lesbians became an exception to the conservative 
rule. 
   Most straight and gay Dutch believed that homosexual emancipation had been 
accomplished by 2001. With nearly all gay rights being enshrined in the law, without any 
discriminatory regulations left over, and with the opening of marriage to same-sex 
couples, they believed the struggle for equal rights had ended and the gay and lesbian 
movement could close its doors. Legal rights did not mean social equality, however. 
Fortuyn was one of the first to denounce the new situation in which queers were bashed, 
school teachers did not dare any longer to be “out” in front of their classes, and gays and 
lesbians were chased out of their homes by young neighborhood hoodlums. The media 
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typically described such incidents as being perpetrated by young Muslim men who did 
not like queers. This group may have been overrepresented in these cases, but there were 
many white males involved. Gay and lesbian social emancipation had not been 
accomplished, although the white majority liked to portray itself as liberal and 
progressive; it was innocent of such assaults, projecting them onto ethnic minority and, in 
particular, Muslim male youth. The Dutch, who had only recently started to tolerate gays 
and lesbians, now created a distinction between a nation that prided itself on having 
always been tolerant of religious diversity and women’s emancipation—now adding 
support for homosexual emancipation—and Muslims that did not. The latter were 
accused of regarding their own religion as the one and only true faith, looking down on 
non-Muslims. They were also thought to have no respect for women and homosexuals or 
their legal and social rights. After 2001, the dichotomy between a gay-tolerant Holland 
and Muslims who were intolerant to the level of violence escalated with the affair of 
Khalil El Moumni. 
 
IV.  El Moumni6 
 
On March 7, 2001, the daily newspaper De Volkskrant reported on anti-homosexual 
violence in Rotterdam, the city of the national Gay Pride celebration to be held in June of 
the same year. Under the ominous heading “No Gay Man Dares to Go Out to Party in 
Rotterdam in Latex,” it reported that especially ethnic minorities would be prone to queer 
bashing. A gay man told the reporter that he had been chased out of his apartment by 
Turkish neighbors, who had not only threatened him, but had actually beaten him up. 
They objected to his walking naked in his ground-floor apartment and to his 
homosexuality. The police had recommended that he move to another part of town. 
Professor of Sociology Han Entzinger, specialist on ethnic minorities and advisor to the 
government, suggested in the same article that gay men should restrain themselves and 
make their sexuality not too public, thus adding white straight norms to the topic of 
Muslim anti-gay violence.7 
   After this article was published, editors of the daily television program “Behind the 
News” on Nova picked up the issue. They aired the program on the third of May, the day 
before the national commemoration of those who died in the Second World War, which 
is a very symbolic moment for the older generation. The opening featured gay men 
telling about being harassed by Moroccan youngsters. Members of a group of Moroccans 
then expressed their abhorrence of homosexuality. Interviews with gay Muslims were cut 
out of the program. The central story was about imam El Moumni, who made statements 
against homosexuality. He said that it was forbidden in Islam and that Dutch society 
would disappear if it allowed the disease of homosexuality to spread. Later, it would 
become known that he had also opposed queer bashing, but again, that part was left out 
by the editors of the program. This editing policy made the statements of the imam more 
explosive as it gave the impression that he inspired the violence against gay men.8 On the 
other hand, the imam had at greater length deplored homosexuality and stated in a book 
that Europeans were less than dogs or pigs because these animals at least do not know 
same-sex marriages.9 
   The television show caused a storm in Holland. The day after it aired, the gay 
movement reacted with indignation and a gay member of parliament suggested investing 
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more in citizenship lessons for imams. Two others suggested extraditing El Moumni to 
his home country. His position was, however, supported by imams of various mosques. 
Panels on homosexuality and Islam were organized while journalists, scholars, gays, and 
straights voiced their opinion. Several gay men filed a complaint against the imam, but 
the case proved unsuccessful and he was acquitted on appeal.10 Various Christian leaders 
had been acquitted in the past after voicing similar anti-gay ideas because of the freedom 
of religious expression. Islam and Christianity were not that far apart in their ideas on 
homosexuality, which derive from similar sources, with liwat (the sin of the people of 
Lot) being similar to sodomy (the sin of the inhabitants of Sodom where Lot lived). While 
the main Dutch Protestant churches had changed their interpretation of this story from a 
condemnation of homosexuality to one of not respecting the laws of hospitality, most 
Muslims (and orthodox and evangelical Christians) had kept to the traditional view. 
   The Minister of Urban Affairs rejected the intolerance of the imam, and wanted to talk 
to El Moumni and his colleagues.11 This meeting with some hastily assembled Muslim 
leaders was disappointing. El Moumni regretted his remarks, according to the minister, 
but immediately after the encounter, the imam repeated (in front of the cameras) his 
beliefs about homosexuality once more.12 The stern speech of the Minister of Urban 
Affairs in support of tolerance and the acceptance of homosexuality was repeated by the 
Prime Minister, who used the full ten minutes of his weekly interview warning the 
Muslims to respect Dutch tolerance of homosexuality.13 It was one of the very few times 
he spoke in public about homosexuality during his eight years in office. Some ethnic 
minority members denounced the unbalanced reaction of the Dutch political 
establishment to the remarks of the imam. The Prime Minister never spoke out against 
the anti-gay ideas of Christians and the Minister of Urban Affairs never invited the 
Catholic clergy to discuss the concepts of liberal tolerance and gay emancipation.14 
Although the topic was high on the political agenda, no politician came up with concrete 
proposals to improve the situation (for example, policies ensuring the safety of gays and 
lesbians or for an enhanced public visibility of homosexuality). It merely boiled down to 
the sermons of imams against the pontifications of politicians. 
   Gay and Muslim organizations, including the Islam and Citizenship Foundation and 
Yoesuf, the organization focusing on homosexuality, met and issued a declaration. They 
regretted the remarks of El Moumni and spoke out in favor of continued discussion 
among all concerned groups, in the best Dutch tradition. This was later done in Dialoog 
meetings. They also urged politicians and police to combat violence and discrimination 
whether it regarded Muslims or gays, and demanded more attention to sexual diversity in 
schools and social work.15 Shortly after the scandal, Omar Nahas of Yoesuf published 
Islam en Homoseksualiteit, which offers a more liberal Islamic view. According to his 
interpretation, it is sexual abuse rather than homosexuality that is forbidden. 
  
V.  Gay Ethnic Minority Visibility16 
 
On several occasions the scandal exploded again. Half a year later, a Surinamese imam 
declared that, according to the Qur’an, public homosexuality deserved the death 
penalty.17 In an Amsterdam mosque, a religious tract was found that stated that men 
guilty of homosexuality should be thrown from the highest building. Every time, the 
media reacted loudly and politicians announced measures, but nothing happened except 
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that most Dutch by now believed that in Islam homosexuality is generally seen as a sin 
that should be punished with the death penalty. 
   Another result was a greater visibility of Arab and Muslim homosexuality. Newspapers 
published long articles on the abundant closeted homosexual life in Muslim countries.18 
Several authors referred to the rich tradition of gay poetry in Arabic.19 The Foundation 
Yoesuf was often asked for comments and made clear that Muslim and gay are not 
mutually exclusive, but may be combined in persons and groups. The day after the imam 
spoke out against homosexuality, the first gay Arab bar in Amsterdam, Habibi Ana (My 
Beloved), was opened. After some hesitation, Habibi Ana took part in the annual Gay 
Canal Parade with an Arabian “1001 Nights” boat that was a big hit in the media.20 The 
bar’s owner is a Dutch-Egyptian Coptic Christian. Very few of the gay ethnic 
spokespersons were, or are, second-generation Turks or Moroccans. The leaders of 
Yoesuf were exiles from Syria and Sudan, while Cem Ariklar of the International 
Platform of Turkish Homosexuals (IPOTH, 1995–2000) was Christian. The gay Arab 
spokespersons of Secret Garden (since 1995) and the Foundation Habibi Ana (since 
2001) are, respectively, an Algerian and a Palestinian exile. After 2001, the only second-
generation Moroccan in this group, Chafik Gadir, started the foundation Nafar for North-
African men with homosexual feelings. Hakan Kuyucu, who came to Holland for his 
studies, founded the Turkish Harem Events, organized parties and participated in panels.  
   Most gay ethnic organizations are male initiatives, and often rely on the one person 
who founded it. Consequently, IPOTH, Yoesuf, and Harem Events collapsed after their 
initiators left. Yoesuf became the multicultural Malaica in 2009, and Pink Istanbul took 
the place of Harem Events in 2007. These organizations are mainly for Arabs, Muslims, 
and Turks. The last Surinamese organizations, SuHo (Surinamese Homosexuals) and 
Sister Outsider, stopped around 1986. There has never been a specifically Moroccan 
foundation. The one mixed ethnic organization, Strange Fruit, was active in the 1990s 
and dissolved just before 2001. Most gay ethnic initiatives were concentrated in 
Amsterdam, but SuHo had a strong base in The Hague, and other cities saw some minor 
activities. In the Bijlmer (Amsterdam South-East), a gay and lesbian black Surinamese 
underground world of parties and support networks was only known to the initiated. The 
Arab gay parties of Secret Garden and Habibi Ana are also highly successful, but under 
the condition that the visitors may stay anonymous. 
   The ethnic gay movements had complicated relations with the main white LGBT 
organization, Center for Culture and Recreation (COC). Originating in 1946, this name 
dates from 1948. The COC did not handle cooperation with the other groups very well 
due to cultural misunderstandings. It was also too preoccupied with itself and lobbying 
local and national governments, while paying less attention to the desires and demands of 
its members, white or black. On the other hand, the ethnic gay organizations never 
became very professional. They faced problems with the technicalities of planning and 
grant demands. Their main problem was ambivalence towards homosexuality. They 
resisted identity and confrontational politics, regarded gay white men as preoccupied with 
sex and homosexuality, circumvented explicit language, and were not too eager to 
criticize ethnic cultures that relied strongly on families and religions that were not very 
open to (sometimes even strongly opposed to) homosexuality. This ambivalence between 
their “own” ethnic and gay community, between family and individual, and between 
speaking and silencing (with the closet ajar), made them quite invisible. Sometimes they 
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denied their identity because in their cultures, sexual identities would not exist. They 
moved back and forth between romantic ideas of gay freedoms and painful memories of 
denial or rejection of homosexuality in their cultures of origin. The queer ethnic identities 
that indeed exist often belong to the most abject: the man who has lost his honor and 
masculinity because he likes to be penetrated, the zemel of Moroccans, the ibne of Turks, 
the boeler of Surinamese. For gay-identified ethnic minority men and women, there is in 
general no way back to their culture of origin. They do not feel at home in white gay 
culture, and a third way is not being developed. Many of them get stuck in a dead-end 
alley. The desire of authorities to render them visible and produce gay ethnic role models 
made politicians invest subsidies in movements that have difficulties in playing the 
political game of identity, community, visibility, and the clear language of sexual 
citizenship. One should not, however, exaggerate the level of visibility and strong speech 
of white gays and lesbians. Certainly in “tolerant” Netherlands, they have become 
complacent and enjoy the limited freedoms of the gay-friendly enclaves to which they 
have moved. 
 
VI.  Right, Left, and the Gay Cause 
 
In the years following the El Moumni affair and the Fortuyn murder, the Netherlands saw 
a major new novelty. The extreme Right had nearly always been opposed to 
homosexuals, gay rights, and queer visibility, but nonetheless homosexuals often had 
leading positions in right- wing parties and groups, the most well-known case being Ernst 
Röhm, comrade in arms of Hitler and leader of the SA, or, much less known, in the 1970s 
in Holland, Henri Brookman and Alfred Vierling. With Fortuyn, it embraced for the first 
time a gay leader and gay rights (or some people would rather say tolerance of gays and 
lesbians). Soon Fortuyn would find followers like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Rita Verdonk, and 
Geert Wilders, who all belonged to the VVD, but Verdonk and Wilders later created their 
own parties, Trots op Nederland (Proud of the Netherlands) and the Partij van de Vrijheid 
(Party of Freedom). Like Fortuyn’s successor in Rotterdam, Marco Pastors, they all 
spoke out forcefully in favor of homosexual rights and often at the same time against the 
Muslims that endangered Dutch gender and sexual freedoms because of their sexist and 
homophobic ideology. Their outspoken perspective created a dichotomy of the 
“progressive” Dutch and the “backward” Muslims who had no respect for Dutch 
tolerance and should be taught what Western morality meant. Multicultural society had 
been a mistake of the “Left church,” which developed a very negative meaning and many 
journalists and intellectuals who had been leftist turned to the right. They contended that 
the Dutch should become proud of their nation and history again. This has led to various 
initiatives going from more citizenship lessons or classes about Dutch history to the 
initiative for a national museum dedicated to stricter immigration laws. 
   The support of the right-wing leaders was very different in quality. Fortuyn himself was 
an openly gay man but his party had no homosexual agenda. Verdonk, Minister of 
Immigration and Integration for the VVD (2003–2007), was a real “fag hag”: she loved 
gay men and was surrounded by a gay clique. When she started her own party, Proud of 
Netherlands, in 2007, her main advisor and supporter was Ed Sinke, a gay man who had 
been chairperson of the Amsterdam VVD. The COC leader, Frank van Dalen, belonged 
to this group, and he invited Verdonk to be on the jury of the annual Gay Parade in 2007. 
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Her party lost its one seat in the parliamentary elections of 2010, but still had a boat in 
the annual Amsterdam Gay Canal Parade that year. In her youth, she had been leftist and 
a member of the pacifist-socialist party, forerunner of the Green Left (GL). As VVD 
Minister, she obliged new immigrants to the Netherlands from the Global South to pass 
an examination at the Dutch Embassy in their home country. They must be able to speak 
some Dutch and know about Dutch culture. The 2005 documentary “Naar Nederland” 
(Coming to the Netherlands) was part of the teaching material. It showed images of 
women with nude breasts on a beach, half-naked people at a pop festival, a lesbian and a 
gay marriage, and two men kissing in a landscape.21 Because in Muslim countries this 
imagery was deemed obscene, an abridged version was produced without this material. 
Some queer theorists have denounced this documentary as Islamophobic because of the 
gay material used to frighten Muslims,22 but at the same time it fulfills the demands of 
the LGBT movement to include gay and lesbian material in public representations of the 
Netherlands, from history books and museums to tourist information. The critique of the 
movie by queer theorists backfires because no gay or lesbian visibility will ever be 
possible as long as it offends orthodox (and other) people who dislike or reject 
homosexuality. 
   Many Dutch also would rather not see kissing gay men representing their country. In 
fact, some 42 percent of the population rejects two men kissing in public, as was shown 
in the documentary. A tension apparently exists between Verdonk’s liberal image and the 
lack of tolerance that nearly half of the Dutch voice. Liberal and secular attitudes toward 
sexual imagery frighten many people, but this should be no reason to halt the struggle for 
sexual citizenship rights. Sexuality is not solely a private affair without public 
consequences, as many Dutch people would rather like to see it. 
   Hirsi Ali had worked for the Labor Party but walked over to the VVD and became one 
of its Members of Parliament. She was very concerned with the plight of Muslim women, 
but found little support in the concerned group because she was considered to be too 
harsh on Islam, for example accusing the Prophet of child abuse because he had sexual 
relations with his wife Aisha when she was nine years old. Her documentary, 
“Submission” (2004), showed a woman whose naked body was totally veiled but still 
visible. Verses of the Qur’an that expressed the secondary role of women in Islam were 
written on her body while female voices told stories of abuse and violence by Muslim 
men. The movie created a worldwide scandal.23 She and the producer, Theo van Gogh, 
received death threats and the same year, Van Gogh was murdered by an orthodox 
Muslim who left a letter stuck with a knife on his dead body addressed to Hirsi Ali (who 
was probably too well protected to be the murderer’s target). Hirsi Ali had wanted to 
make a movie about the persecution of gays by Muslims as a sequel to “Submission,” that 
showed gay men rather than women as victims of Islam. That documentary was never 
made. 
   In 2006, Hirsi Ali gave a speech at the opening of the first Dutch exposition on the 
persecution of homosexuals in Nazi times. Her presence was already controversial 
beforehand because some gay and lesbian intellectuals protested against her appropriation 
of the gay issue, but they found little support. Their tactics were not very convincing, as 
they downplayed the discrimination against gay men and lesbians, both in Holland and in 
Turkey, suggesting that Hirsi Ali exaggerated the problematization of the gay issue.24 In 
her speech, Hirsi Ali stressed how important the topic in fact was, and also how much she 
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learned in this regard from her first teacher of Dutch, a gay man. This is a recurrent 
theme in the integration story of leaders with Muslim backgrounds: Mohammed Sini, 
Haci Karacaer and Rotterdam’s mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb told similar stories. Sini even 
translated the love letters of his gay teacher to a Moroccan lover. This speech was the 
final public performance of Hirsi Ali as Dutch MP, because her Dutch identity was 
questioned some weeks later by then Minister Verdonk (both women being of the same 
party) as she had not given her real name when she sought asylum in Holland. In the end, 
Hirsi Ali was allowed to keep her Dutch passport but sought refuge in the United States 
where she now works for the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research (which would never allow her to make a gay “Submission”). 
   Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) are nowadays the main voice of the right 
wing. The party has grown from nine (2006) to 24 (2010), out of 150 seats in parliament, 
and is now a candidate for government participation. They use the question of gay rights 
as a way to denounce Muslims because of their homophobia. Any occasion of queer 
bashing is being used by his party against Muslims, notwithstanding the many young 
white men who also commit this kind of violence. According to the former responsible 
minister, Ronald Plasterk, without referring to any data, half of the youngsters involved 
in anti-gay violence belongs to an ethnic minority. The PVV, however, is convinced it 
must be 80 percent.25 The party also complains that the minister is too soft on this issue, 
and has suggested that he replace his approach with the punishment that the perpetrators 
should clean the dark sex rooms of gay bars.26 
   In 2008, Wilders followed in Hirsi Ali’s steps by making an anti-Muslim film, “Fitna.” 
It denounced both the oppression of women and gay men in Islam, and included footage 
of the execution of two gay youth in Iran.27 The Dutch feared the reactions of Muslims 
and Muslim countries, but the film did not create the national and international 
commotion that “Submission” produced, probably because of its amateur quality in terms 
of production and acumen. 
   Most of the right-wing support has remained rhetoric. At the same time, the Left and 
liberal parties, who have supported gay rights for a longer time (although often half-
heartedly), became more wary of continuing to do so. They were afraid they could lose 
their important constituency of ethnic minority voters, who have no strong inclination to 
discuss homosexuality, let alone engage with gay rights issues (most clearly the case with 
the PvdA). In 2004, leftist ideals of multiculturalism were once more shattered with the 
murder of Theo van Gogh. At that time, Amsterdam’s mayor, Job Cohen (PvdA), started 
an intensive program of urban solidarity, We Amsterdammers, which was intended to 
combat the antagonisms that also appeared to be part and parcel of ethnic diversity. In the 
past, the Left had always underlined the positive sides of multiculturalism. Cohen has 
often been accused of “drinking tea” with the different groups, and although he himself 
claimed its utter necessity, his right-wing opponents would see it as façade politics. After 
several incidents of anti-gay violence, the city also included gays and lesbians more 
actively in their strategies for urban cohesion. Apart from antagonisms regarding 
ethnicity and religion, homosexuality and sexual morality became regarded as issues of 
controversy between tolerant old Amsterdammers and intolerant Moroccans (and other 
ethnic minorities) that divided society. Although the city stepped up its subsidies for 
LGBT emancipation, especially for ethnic gay organizations, very little was structural. It 
was based on short-term repression, like security cameras in gay areas, rather than on 
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long-term prevention. What the queer movement always regarded as essential—more 
investments in sexual and gender diversity education—was never realized, although some 
of the LGBT projects were intended for schools. 
   The year 2009 witnessed the rise to national prominence of Ahmed Marcouch, mayor 
of the Amsterdam borough of Slotervaart, because of his pro-homosexual policies. This 
former police officer and Labor party man of Moroccan descent had already become 
known because he did not defend youngsters of his own ethnicity, but said without 
qualms that they were real nuisances for everybody. In 2009, he published a report in 
which he stated certain aims for his neighborhood. First, he wanted a gay/Muslim bar (all 
Amsterdam gay bars are in the center city) and suggested the annual Gay Parade should 
start in his district. The first topic is still pending, but the second happened. In 2009, the 
city’s own boat, with Marcouch and Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen, took off from Nieuwe 
Meer (New Lake), which is also the location of Amsterdam’s largest public cruising area. 
Marcouch, moreover, suggested two more long-term aims: sexual citizenship education 
that definitively would include LGBT topics for the schools in his vicinity and looking 
behind the front doors of homes, meaning that he intended to control parental education 
in terms of the treatment of girls and LGBT children. In a country where the nuclear 
family has a “holy” status, this was radical. It also was too drastic for his own party, 
which became very divided. Many accused him of moving forward too quickly or of 
being overly engaged in gay emancipation. 
   By breaking through Labor’s hesitating attitudes, Marcouch showed how ambivalent 
his party remains on gay issues. He also attacked both Christian parties that were in the 
government with Labor, the Christian Democrats (CDA, then Holland’s largest party) 
and the Christian Union (CU, a small orthodox Protestant party). According to him, the 
leaders of both parties, Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Vice Prime Minister 
André Rouvoet, should come forward in support of LGBT emancipation, not only for the 
country but also because the topic remains difficult for their own voters and inside their 
own parties. A black evangelical female member proposed, for example, to exclude open 
gays and lesbians from official posts in the CU. When Balkenende was questioned by 
Muslim students in Indonesia about Dutch gay marriage, the first thing he remarked was 
that he himself had voted against it, thus showing his homophobia while being in 
function.28 In January 2010, Marcouch lost the election for the social-democrat leadership 
in his district by a narrow margin to an unknown Moroccan opponent. The strong support 
of local and national leaders of his party had not helped him, showing how controversial 
his pro-gay policies were in his own ethnically diverse district. Because of his popularity 
among the party’s leaders for being one of the very few charming and convincing Labor 
politicians, his career did not end there, and he became MP for Labour in the 2010 
elections. 
   The attitudes of Left and Right show how confused the situation in Holland is. All 
secular parties support gay rights and in orthodox Protestant circles they discuss the issue 
with vehemence while the CDA remains silent but tolerates in its own ranks married gays 
and lesbians. The CDA had in the former cabinets an openly lesbian minister of 
agriculture and an openly gay minister of economy, both married to a same-sex partner. 
Notwithstanding this “openness,” homosexuality is still regarded with ambivalent 
feelings. Although same-sex marriages have been legal since 2001, under the present 
government, civil servants are allowed not to register such weddings if they have moral 
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objections. This would never be allowed with Jewish, Muslim, or mixed marriages to 
which civil servants might object. All parties hesitate to fully embrace LGBT 
emancipation, and often only pay lip service to it. As previously noted, the political 
support is more project-based than structural management, more rhetoric than investment. 
It is often very normative because of the condition that queers must behave in a “normal” 
way. 
 
VII.  The Situation of Gays and Lesbians 
 
In 2006, a government commissioned report on the acceptance of gays and lesbians, to 
which I contributed, was published.29 In general, up to 95 percent of the Dutch population 
is said to have no objections to homosexuality. This is the highest score of being gay 
friendly worldwide. Yet when more specific questions are asked, and homosexuality gets 
“closer,” the percentages drop quickly. As mentioned, 42 percent of the Dutch do not 
want to see two men kissing in the streets, 31 percent object to two women doing the 
same, while only eight percent states so about a mixed couple. In different fields 
(adoption, gay and lesbian neighbors, best friends, private physician, teacher) and with 
various groups, numbers of homo-negativity remain high. Additionally, one wonders 
about the “politically correct” nature of these answers. The government also wanted to 
know about levels of discrimination. The report concluded that intolerance, including 
insults and violence against gays and lesbians and non-acceptance in schools, in families 
and workplaces still continued at levels that were difficult to assess because of dark 
numbers. Two-thirds of Dutch gays and lesbians report negative experiences related to 
their sexual orientation despite the assumption that they will not experience these because 
they often behave in “normal” ways and many will do so out of self-protection. Many 
gays and lesbians, and also authorities, continue to accept discrimination as being routine 
and often do not record the relevant cases. A usual reaction of teachers, school directors, 
and parents to a youngster being insulted is not to protect them but to say it does not 
mean anything. 
   What was most remarkable from the interviews done with gays and lesbians on 
experiences in the workplace was the heteronormativity. The gay men in particular 
strongly desired to be seen as normal in terms of gender. Coming out was not really an 
issue any longer, because if they did not come out themselves, their colleagues would out 
them. Being out was a positive thing, however much struggle it might have cost. People 
who were suspected of being gay or lesbian and who were not out were not highly 
regarded. But being out for gay men meant that they should not behave in “unmasculine” 
or overly sexual ways. The terms of communication were set by straight people who 
could say that gay men should not be too preoccupied with their sexual preference and 
should “shut up.” At other places and moments, straight people would not hesitate to ask 
the most intimate questions that they themselves would never discuss with others, for 
example about “male” and “female” roles in couples, dark rooms, cruising, or kinky sex. 
Gay men were never allowed to physically touch straight colleagues who would not 
hesitate themselves to do so “for fun.” In general, lesbians were as always much more 
invisible. Gay parades often functioned as a negative reference point for both gay and 
straight. They were considered to be too transgressive in terms of gender and sexual 
behavior: too much drag, nudity, and kinky sex. The acceptance of gay men was always 
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under the condition that they must not be too visible, unmasculine or sexual.30 
   When it comes to ethnicity, the report concluded that anti-homosexual attitudes were to 
be found among people who were actively involved in religion and had less education. 
These factors are higher among ethnic minorities. Websites of Moroccans and Turks, but 
also those catering to right-wing young males, had higher levels of anti-gay remarks than 
orthodox Christian ones. So the picture of tolerance for gays and lesbians was not very 
comforting and the high expectations of 2001, when legal equality was realized, did not 
materialize in the social world of 2006. Gays and lesbians remained second-class citizens 
and if they were accepted, it was under the aforementioned conditions for gay men, while 
the lesbians remained invisible, and many of them appear to like it that way. 
   The report came to several conclusions. Stricter policies should be enacted to counter 
concrete examples of discrimination. Vulnerable groups among gays and lesbians—like 
the young, the elderly, and ethnic minorities—needed additional support. Greater 
visibility was needed, particularly in schools, where most prejudices about homosexuals, 
“sissies,” and “sluts” are learned from peers. As always, since the beginning of gay and 
lesbian emancipation politics in the 1980s, the visibility of lesbians should be enhanced. 
   In the follow-up study of 2010 the acceptance of homosexuality among the Dutch was 
still higher than in 2006, but on the other hand, the pressure to behave “normally” had not 
changed, or perhaps had even become stronger for students in primary and secondary 
schools.31 Straight students were said to accept gay and lesbian classmates if they would 
be “authentic,” meaning not behaving differently in terms of gender and sexuality. In 
other words, only heterosexual behavior was seen as authentic, and sexual and gender 
variation was rejected. Survey data indicated that it takes young queers three to four years 
from the realization of same-sex feelings to telling someone else about this, a surprisingly 
long time for a country that praises its levels of acceptance.32 A full fifty percent of the 
young queers surveyed had seriously considered committing suicide, while psychological 
problems such as depression were common among gay and lesbian young people.33 
   Part of the study concerned ethnic minorities (Surinamese, Moroccan, Turkish, and 
Chinese) and orthodox Protestants. In these groups, acceptance of homosexuality is far 
from realized. The attitude is that gays and lesbians should keep silent and not trouble 
straight culture. Homosexuality continued to be rejected because it is “sinful,” 
pathological, and/or unnatural, and because gays and lesbians did not marry and 
reproduce, were gender dissidents, engaged in filthy sex, and made visible what should 
remain invisible. Most gays and lesbians from these groups kept silent and remained 
invisible out of consideration for their parents and families, as well as indisputably 
fearing or having already experienced negative reactions. Few people, and mainly 
politicians in the case of ethnic minorities, took up their defense, and with limited 
success. Acceptance of homosexuality has become a litmus test for Dutch citizenship. 
Although one may question how many “white” Dutch would pass it, ethnic minorities, 
like orthodox Protestants, are seen as the people who do not accept gays and lesbians. 
Because of the pressure to integrate, a considerable number of ethnic people—in 
particular Muslims—opt out, migrate, or radicalize. As long as they are “white,” 
orthodox Christians are seen as less foreign to Dutch culture, and so they get less 
criticism, but the black evangelicals among them have been the object of social ridicule 
and contempt. 
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   Another report I participated in regarded anti-gay violence in Amsterdam.34 The city 
requested a study after several incidents were widely reported in the press in the 
aftermath of the Gay Canal Parade of August 2007. The aim was to know the motives of 
the perpetrators. What was surprising was the rhetoric of the city officials who claimed 
that mayor and alderwomen and aldermen discussed the topic on a nearly daily basis, and 
the subsequent lack of the promised support for the study by these politicians and civil 
servants who had claimed great interest. Other local institutions, such as schools, sport 
and ethnic organizations, and youth social workers, were hesitant to cooperate as well. 
Ambivalence regarding homosexuality remained the rule in Holland’s gay capital. The 
results of the research confirmed the national study. Some 200 cases of anti-gay violence 
were reported to the police in 2007, from insults to robberies and severe physical injuries. 
The perpetrators were mainly young men, with Moroccans being overrepresented. Of the 
47 perpetrators arrested for physical violence, 36 percent were white and 36 percent 
Moroccan, while their representation among youngsters under 25 years in Amsterdam is, 
respectively, 39 percent and 16 percent. Surinamese were clearly underrepresented, 
accounting for four percent of the perpetrators but twelve percent of the youth. Both 
perpetrators and young men from the groups that they belong to were interviewed: white 
hooligans, marines and fraternity (corps in Dutch) students,35 and urban street youth of 
Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, and Antillean descent. Additional cases were used from 
court and probation offices,36 and a survey was done among secondary school students. 
   The perpetrators and the male youth generally stated they accepted homosexuals, but, 
again, on the condition that they should not behave in unmasculine, too sexual, or too 
visible ways. Most problems arose when the young men felt they were the object of 
unwanted gay attention. In most cases, this gay interest was probably more imagined than 
real, and interestingly, some of the perpetrators visited gay places (discos, cruising areas) 
out of curiosity, and then discovered that in those situations, gay men are not only objects 
but also subjects of desire. The straight youngsters did not want to become an object of 
desire, a position they consider to belong to females. (Their ideas show little rationality 
because they were afraid of the overtures of gay men, but why should they be afraid of 
those unmasculine men?) They disliked homosexual visibility, although the Moroccan 
men in particular preferred queers to be visible (so as to prevent unexpected proposals 
from gay men who behave “normally”). 
   They found homosexuality so filthy that they eagerly wanted to watch it. And their idea 
that men should be the subject and women the object of desire has little to do with sexual 
reality in which roles are not dichotomous, but are mixed in different ways. Their ideas 
about homosexuality focused mainly on gender and sexual issues. When the young men 
in the focus groups were asked to give their first impressions about homosexuality, it was 
all about anal sex and gender and not about religion. It does not mean that their negative 
attitudes had nothing to do with religion, but that their spontaneous ideas regarded gender 
and sexuality. 
   Although the survey also showed more accepting attitudes, the abusive climate of 
schools and schoolyards became particularly clear. Up to fifty percent of the male pupils 
were confronted with insults that targeted their gender and/or sexual behavior as being 
inappropriate (meaning too unmasculine or non-heterosexual). To twenty percent, this 
happened frequently. Only ten percent of the male students expressed homosexual 
preferences, indicating that not only young gays and lesbians are targets of such 
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disciplining behavior, but also many others that deviate from what are deemed to be 
appropriate gender and sexual roles. This study also made clear that heterosexuals are 
being created and that this production of straight kids demands great coercion. This goes 
together with the enforcement of dichotomous gender roles: boys should become men 
and girls should become women. It is likely that the presence of large numbers of ethnic 
minority students strengthens this sexual and gender disciplining, on the one hand 
because they come from families that are more prone to impose dichotomous gender 
roles and are more likely to deny homosexual inclinations, and on the other hand because 
school teachers in “black schools” (with a majority of non-white students) are more 
hesitant to discuss, let alone criticize, traditional gender and sexual norms. Teachers and 
authorities do little to counter them out of the fear of having to deal with “difficult” 
themes, such as AIDS, homosexuality, or masturbation. Sometimes they even enhance 
them by lax policies, not defending insulted queer adolescents, and not changing a school 
climate that is intolerant of gender and sexual diversity. The minimal investment in sex 
education, which is not obligatory in Dutch schools, has not changed. If it happens at all, 
it remains focused on the biology of sex organs, STDs, and how to prevent unwanted 
pregnancies.37 Due to the very ambivalent and sometimes prejudiced attitudes of the 
secondary school students, the study suggested that more attention is needed for sexual 
citizenship education, certainly in black schools. Topics like Arab pederast history or 
Surinamese lesbians could be included for all schools because social forms of 
homosexuality are not particular to Western countries, as some people assume.38  
 
VIII.  Conclusions 
 
We have gone a long way from Morocco as a gay paradise to the present situation in the 
Netherlands, where Moroccans are considered homophobes. There is now a cultural 
divide that differentiates, in white Dutch eyes, the liberal, pro-gay Dutch from the 
conservative, anti-gay Muslims. It is an artificial divide. Nowadays, prejudices against 
homosexuality remain strong among young Dutch men and are not very different 
between white and ethnic minority groups. Gay men are often seen by male youth of all 
ethnicities as unmasculine, oversexual, and too visible, and may only be accepted under 
the condition that they do not show any of this behavior. On one hand, Dutch politics and 
institutions proclaim that they reject anti-gay attitudes, but there are few signs that these 
proclamations are more than empty rhetoric. Little is done to defend gays and lesbians, 
certainly not “sissies” and “dykes,” and nothing is done to break through the 
heteronormativity of Dutch culture. Homosexuality has become a big issue and gays and 
lesbians may enjoy the pleasure of receiving much attention but their situation is not 
being improved. In fact, the mounting number of gender- and gay-related slurs and 
insults in schoolyards seems rather to indicate that gender roles are more strictly imposed 
and heterosexuality becomes an increasingly rigid norm. Gay and lesbian emancipation 
may work out well for those who identify as homosexual, but the relative openness and 
visibility are creating an ever stronger separation of homo- and heterosexuality because 
the former remains the marginal and rejected category. 
   This goes with a normalization of queers who should not be obvious, overly sexual, or 
unmasculine. According to straight journalists, gay men should give up public cruising 
and the promiscuity of dark rooms because they can marry. The gay movement has by 
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now successfully distanced itself from pedophiles, accepting an age of consent of sixteen 
years. This delivers the younger queers to heteronormative institutions like family, 
school, and sports. Young queers will have great difficulties in defending variant 
gendered and sexual expressions of themselves and others against the pressure of parents, 
peers, and others, or to begin to understand queer institutions of the past such as a gay 
community, public and kinky sex, or promiscuity. This leads to questions of sexual 
democracy or citizenship rights in contemporary societies. At what age do such privileges 
start (for the United Nations, at age 18); what do they include and exclude; why should 
monogamy, marriage, heterosexuality, and privacy be the sexual norm; and why do 
certain sexual practices like pedophilia, bestiality, public sex, and sex work become 
unthinkable? 
   The homosexual situation in the Netherlands looks very much like what Joe Massad 
fears for the Arab world once the “Gay International” has imposed gay identities on a 
world that does not know them.39 His fear that the Arab world will be divided between a 
normative heterosexual majority and a marginal gay minority has become true in the 
Netherlands, and in the Western world more generally. There is even a growing group of 
gay-identifying Arabs and Turks. Massad’s idea that homosexual identities are imposed 
by LGBT movements is overestimating their influence. Rather, NGOs, media, movies, 
sciences, churches and other social institutions spread the gay and straight messages. It is 
a global development in which the “Gay International” plays a minor role, even in the 
West. On the one hand, Massad does not even offer the suggestion of a solution about 
how to counter the imposition of Western sexual ideologies. On the other hand, he has 
little compassion for the miseries that non-normative Arabs suffer for their sexual 
behavior (i.e., girls that “should” stay at home or do not accept arranged marriages; ibnes 
and zemels that face abjection or even worse, in some countries, the death penalty). Such 
agonies are too easily attributed to (post)colonialism. Many criticisms are possible about 
gay and lesbian emancipation and sexual identity politics, but numerous male, female, 
and transgender queers profited from those models and defend them. 
   Queer scholars have taken the position that we should reject the Islamophobia of the 
Right, and of gay men, but have not formulated an answer to the homophobia of Muslims 
and sometimes deny its existence. The same people who have rarely hesitated to attack 
the Catholic church for its stance on homosexuality, abortion, or condoms, suddenly 
hesitate to criticize the similar ideas of Muslims. There is little chance that the 
compassion queers feel for Muslims will diminish the Islamophobia of “secular” Dutch 
people. It neither helps themselves, queer Muslims, their families, nor third parties. It will 
not make the orthodox Muslims accept gays, lesbians, queers, transgenders, and certainly 
not the abjected ibnes or zemels. 
   It is interesting to think about queer practices and cultures of homosexual pleasures in 
the Orient and Occident without gay identities. There is little chance to see such a 
situation given the global emergence of LGBT communities and movements that 
embrace this identity. It is unrealistic to denounce its middle-class character. A better 
answer is to defend local and global sexual alternatives while struggling against straight 
and marital norms and strict gender roles—to discover and stimulate queer paradises in 
Holland, Morocco, and elsewhere. It is much better not to oppose Oriental or Occidental 
queer worlds, but to use common grounds to resist straight norms and the imposition on 
queers to behave “normally.” Perhaps the East is closer to such a utopia than the West. 
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Notes 
 
1.  Although I prefer the term anti-homosexual to homophobic, I will use both. One 
should read both terms in their social dimension: social rejection of homosexuality. 
Homophobia, which is most often used in Dutch, sounds too psychological. Anti-queer 
attitudes are a social more than an individual or psychological problem because they are 
hammered into youngsters’ heads by families, peers, schools, and other social 
institutions. See Murray (2009) for an international overview. 
 
2.  Numbers for 2010 are on their website, cbs.nl (Dutch Central Office for Statistics). I 
will use in this article Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, Antillean, and Chinese for Dutch-
Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Surinamese, Dutch-Antillean and Dutch-Chinese. It 
will become clear from the context when I use these terms for Turkish Turks, etc. 
 
3.  Green 1992. 
 
4.  Cottaar et al. 2009. 
 
5.  Pels 2003. 
 
6.  This and the next part of the article are partially based on my earlier article (Hekma 
2002), which discusses this affair in greater detail. 
 
7.  Of course, sexuality has its public sides and, in fact, gay and lesbian emancipation has 
always been about going public—coming out of the closet—and visibility. These have 
been the aims of the gay movement and the government, at least in contemporary 
Holland, since the 1980s. Heterosexuality is utterly public as an institution, with its 
families and marriage. Advertisements, scarves, prostitution, media, education, and sex 
laws also make sexuality a public affair (see Leap 1999).  
 
8.  NRC, 31 May 2001. All quoted journal references regard 2001. 
 
9.  Vrij Nederland (26 May 2001); Parool (15 June 2001). 
 
10. NRC (5 May 2001). 
 
11. AD (5 and 7 May 2001). 
 
12. Parool (21 May 2001); AD (25 May 2001). 
 
13. NRC (12 May 2001). 
 
14. Parool (9 June 2001). 
 
15. AD (23 May 2001). 
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16. This section is partly based on research reported in Saskia Keuzenkamp, ed., Steeds 
gewoner, nooit gewoon. Acceptatie van homoseksualiteit in Nederland. Den Haag SCP, 
2010. Colleagues at the University of Amsterdam and I contributed the final part on the 
views about homosexuality of ethnic minority groups—Surinamese, Moroccan, Turkish, 
and Chinese—and orthodox Protestants to the collection. I am personally acquainted with 
most of the aforementioned activists. 
 
17. AD (2 and 5 November 2001). 
 
18. NRC (19 May 2001); Trouw (26 May 2001). 
 
19. AD (21 May 2001). 
 
20. NRC (3 August 2001); AD, Parool and Volkskrant (6 August 2001). 
 
21. The movie also wavers between pride of the Netherlands, its history, and its richness 
and a serious warning for new immigrants that their homes will be in neighborhoods with 
poverty, bad housing, and high levels of criminality. In stark contrast with tourist 
information, the sun rarely shines in this documentary and the immigrants are warned 
about the rain and cold in Holland. The topic of slavery is mentioned very briefly in a 
much longer scene that celebrates the Dutch Golden Age.  
 
22. Butler 2008. 
 
23. See de Leeuw and van Wichelen 2005. 
 
24. Trouw (20 and 21 April 2006). 
 
25. Volkskrant (29 February 2008). 
 
26. De Pers (9 November 2007). 
 
27. The young men, Mahmoud Asgari and Ayaz Marhoni, who were hanged on the 19th 
of July, 2005, were condemned for a crime that they had committed when they were 
legally minors. The “crime” has variously been said to be homosex with each other or the 
homosexual rape of a 13-year-old boy. Other reports claimed racism, the boys being 
Arab. The picture is widely used as a symbol of state violence against gay men, for 
example, on the first boat in the Amsterdam Gay Canal Parade in 2005. For one of many 
discussions, see Pukaar 57 (October 2005). 
 
28. NRC (12 April 2006). 
 
29. Keuzenkamp 2006; Keuzenkamp and Bos 2007. 
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30. I prefer “unmasculine” to “feminine” because the rejection of gay men concerns more 
their inability or refusal to act masculine than that they would perform something 
feminine. 
 
31. Keuzenkamp 2010. 
 
32. Ibid., p. 143. 
 
33. Ibid., pp. 184–194. 
 
34. Buijs et al. 2009. 
 
35. In the case of fraternity students, we interviewed gay instead of straight ones to 
prevent “politically correct” answers that we assume students will provide, knowing the 
Dutch ideology of tolerance. One gay student told us that he worked so hard in “doing 
straight” that he got confused about his sexual preference. 
 
36. van der Vlies 2008. 
 
37. van de Bongardt 2008. 
 
38. See El-Rouayheb 2005; Wekker 2006. 
 
39. Massad 2007. 
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